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cannot exclude from gross income under the $250,000
residence exclusion ($500,000 on a joint return)16 any of the
gain resulting from the deemed sale.17 IRS has ruled to that
effect on the grounds that the statute requires that gain be
recognized “notwithstanding any other provision” of the
Internal Revenue Code.18  Therefore, the gain on the deemed
sale is not eligible for the exclusion on sale of the principal
residence.19
Property sold within one year of deemed election
In late 2000,20 Congress acted to assure that an election to
make a “deemed sale”21 of assets and recognize gain does not
apply to assets disposed of in a recognition transaction within
one year of the date the election would otherwise have been
effective.22  Therefore, if an asset is sold in 2001, no election
may be made with respect to that asset23  In addition, the
deemed sale and repurchase by reason of the election is not to
be taken into account in applying the “wash-sale” rules.24 The
amendment is designed to prevent a taxpayer from generating a
short-term capital loss which could offset a short-term capital
gain from other assets (such as corporate stock).
In conclusion
The changes made in 1997 and 2000 could have important
implications for returns filed for the 2001 tax year.
FOOTNOTES
1 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, Sec. 311,
111 Stat. 831 (1997); Harl, Agricultural Law § 27.06
(2001); Harl, Agricultural Law Manual § 4.02[10] (2001).
See also Harl, “Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (H.R. 2014):
Summary of Selected Provisions,” 8 Agric. L. Dig. 113
(1997).
2 Pub. L. No. 105-34, Sec. 311(d), 111 Stat. 831 (1997).  See
I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(C).
3 I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(B).
4 I.R.C. § 1(h)(2).
5 I.R.C. § 1(h)(2).
6 I.R.C. § 1(h)(2)(B).
7 Id.
8 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, Sec.
311(e), 111 Stat. 831 (1997).
9 See I.R.C. § 1231.
10 See note 8 supra.
11 Id.
12 Id.  See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 220, 105th Cong., 1st Sess.
383 (1997).
13 Id.
14 See note 8 supra.
15 See notes 8-12 supra.
16 I.R.C. § 121.
17 Rev. Rul. 2001-57, I.R.B. 2001-46.
18 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, Sec.
311(e), 111 Stat. 831 (1997).
19 See note 16 supra.
20 Community Renewal Tax Relief and Medical Savings
Account Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, Sec. 314(c).
21 See notes 8-13 supra.
22 See note 19 supra.
23 Id.
24 See I.R.C. § 1091.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
HOMESTEAD. The debtor had initially owned a rural
residence. The debtor purchased an adjacent parcel of land
which had a palm tree nursery on it. The debtor sold palm
trees from the land as a business. The debtor filed for
Chapter 7 and claimed both parcels as exempt rural
homestead property under Fla. Const. art. X, § 4.. The
creditors objected to the homestead exemption for the palm
tree nursery land only, arguing that a homestead could not
include commercial property. The court held that the use of a
portion of a homestead for business purposes did not
disqualify property for the homestead exemption where the
commercial use of the property was consistent with the rural
character of the property. The court noted that a contrary
holding would exclude all farm land from the rural
homestead exemption. In re McLachlan, 266 B.R. 220
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001).
FEDERAL TAX     -ALM § 13.03[7].*
DISCHARGE . The debtor did not timely file returns for
1987, 1988 and 1989. The IRS prepared substitute returns
for those years and made assessments based on the substitute
returns. In 1995, as part of an IRS leniency program, the
debtor filed returns for those years which were almost
identical to the substitute returns used by the IRS. The
debtor filed for Chapter 7 in 1999 and sought to discharge
the taxes for the years involved. The court held that Section
727 applied to make the taxes nondischargeable because the
debtor failed to file a return for the taxes. The court held that
the late-filed returns did not constitute returns for purposes
of Section 727 because the returns served no purpose.
United States v. Ralph, 266 B.R. 217 (M.D. Fla. 2001).
SETOFF. The debtor filed for Chapter 7 on May 19, 1998
and the debtor owed taxes for 1993. The case was
considered a no asset case so no tax claim was filed by the
IRS. The debtor filed and paid 1997 taxes in August 1998,
claiming a refund. The debtor was granted a discharge,
including the 1993 taxes, in September 1998. The IRS
accepted the 1997 tax return but applied the refund to the
1993 taxes. The debtor sought to reopen the Chapter 7 case
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and listed the tax refund as exempt property. The debtor
argued that the tax refund, as exempt property, was not
subject to the IRS’s right of setoff. The issue was whether
Section 522, excluding exempt property from liability for
pre-petition debts, or Section 553, allowing setoff of pre-
petition debts, controlled where a setoff involved exempt
property. The court acknowledged a split of decisions on this
issue and held that Section 553 had precedence over Section
522, although the court did not explain the reason for this
decision. Therefore, the IRS setoff of the refund against the
discharged pre-petition taxes was allowed. The basic
reasoning is that, because Section 553 lists several
exceptions to the setoff rule and does not include Section
522, the Congress did not intend Section 522 to be an
exception to the right of setoff. United States v. Luongo,
259 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2001), aff’g, 255 B.R. 424 (N.D.
Tex. 2000).
CONTRACTS
WARRANTY. The plaintiff corporation was owned by a
farmer who used to farm with a parent until the parent’s
corporation filed for bankruptcy. The farmer wanted to
purchase a planter but could not make the purchase until the
farmer’s corporation, the plaintiff, was formed. The farmer
reached an agreement with a landlord to have the landlord
purchase the planter and then sell the planter to the plaintiff
when formed. The purchase was made and the planter was
eventually sold to the plaintiff corporation. The plaintiff
alleged that the planter was defective and sought damages
for breach of express and implied warranties against the
manufacturer under Kan. Stat. §§ 84-2-313(1)(a), 84-2-314,
84-2-315 and for violation of Kan. Stat. § 50-623 et seq. for
alleged deceptive practices. The court held that Kan. Stat. §§
84-2-313(1)(a) (express warranty) and 84-2-314, 84-2-315
(implied warranties) did not apply because the plaintiff was
not the original purchaser of the planter because the landlord
made the purchase. The plaintiff also argued that Kan. Stat.
§ 50-623 et seq. (deceptive practices) did not apply because
the plaintiff was not the original purchaser of the planter and
because neither the landlord nor the plaintiff was a
“consumer” covered by the statute. Limestone Farms, Inc.
v. Deere & Co., 29 P.3d 457 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001)
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
CLEAN WATER ACT . An environmental organization
had brought a citizens’ suit under the Clean Water Act.
Jurisdiction was allowed by the District Court under the
EPA “migratory bird rule” but a claim for civil penalties was
dismissed. The appellate court reversed and remanded the
case on these issues because Solid Waste Agency of N rthern
Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159
(2001) invalidated the Corps’ “migratory bird rule” as a
basis for jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act. In addition,
the court noted that Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services, Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) held that
private citizens could seek civil penalties for violations of
the Clean Water Act. San Francisco Baykeeper v. Cargill
Salt Div., 263 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 2001).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
FARM LOANS. The plaintiffs, husband and wife, had
borrowed money from the FmHA (now FSA) to purchase
farm land. The plaintiffs defaulted on that loan and were
allowed to deed the farm to the FSA and lease the farm back
from the FSA for five years. The leaseback  agreement also
allowed the plaintiffs the option to repurchase the farm at the
fair market value of the farm on the date the option was
exercised. In June 1997, the husband called the FSA loan
manager and orally notified the FSA that the plaintiffs
intended to repurchase the farm. The FSA ordered an
appraisal in September 1997 which determined a value of
the farm as of October 9, 1997. The FSA also notified the
plaintiffs that they had to make a written exercise of the
option o repurchase the farm. The written option was
xecut d and delivered on May 14, 1998. The National
Appea s Division (NAD) ruled that the appraisal date was
incorrec  and should have been the date the written exercise
of he option was executed, May 14, 1998. A new appraisal
was made for that date. The plaintiffs argued that the option
was properly exercised by the husband in June 1997 and that
the NAD had no authority to require a written exercise of the
option. The court held that the NAD had the authority to
interpret the lease to require a written exercise of the option
and its decision was not arbitrary or capricious. Nich ls v.
Glickman, 156 F. Supp.2d 1173 (D. Or. 2001).
MILK . The plaintiff was a processor of chocolate milk
products and was subject to a regulation which placed milk
used to make chocolate milk in two classes and fixed a price
for each class. The regulation was enacted into law by the
Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-127 by referencing the regulation. The
plaintiff argued that the enactment of the regulation by
referencing violated the Presentment Clause of the U.S.
Constitution and that the regulation and law violated the due
process clause of the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiff argued
that the enactment of the regulation by reference violated the
Presentment Clause because the regulation was not
physically incorporated into the bill enacted by Congress and
signed by the President. The court upheld the
constitutionality of enactment of regulations by reference.
The court also held that the dual pricing system used for
milk used to make chocolate milk had a rational basis and
did not violate the Due Process clause. Hershey Foods v.
U.S.D.A., 158 F. Supp.2d 37 (D. D.C. 2001).
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FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
TAX RATE . The decedent died in March 1993 during a
time when the federal estate tax maximum rate had
decreased to 50 percent because of a presidential veto and
the application of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981.
In August 1993, legislation was passed which retroactively
increased the maximum rate back to 55 percent. The
decedent’s estate argued that the retroactive increase was
unconstitutional. The court upheld the constitutionality of
the retroactive increase in the estate tax rate. NationsBank
of Texas, N.A. v. United States, 2001-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 60,423 (Fed. Cir. 2001), aff’g, 99-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,345 (Fed. Cls. 1999).
TRUSTS. The taxpayers formed a trust and transferred the
income from the taxpayer’s businesses to the trust. The court
held that the trust was a sham and that the trust income was
properly attributed to the taxpayers personally. Residential
Management Services Trust v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
2001-297; United States v. Engels, 2001-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,723 (N.D. Iowa 2001).
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
ACCOUNTING METHOD. The taxpayer was a
corporation which operated a trucking business. The
taxpayer was required to pay for a large number of permits,
licenses, fees and insurance premiums. The items were valid
for up to 12 months, sometimes carrying over to the tax year
after the expense was made. The IRS argued that the
taxpayer had to capitalize the expenses for these items over
two tax years. The IRS pointed to Treas. Reg. §§ 1.263(a)-2,
1.461-1(a)(2) which require an expense to be capitalized if
the item has a benefit to the taxpayer extending substantially
over one year. The court held that the licenses, fees, permits
and insurance premiums were properly allowed as a current
deduction because (1) they all had benefits which lasted only
one year, (2) the expenses reoccurred each tax year, and (3)
the timing of the expenses was determined by independent
government agencies. U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Comm’r,
2001-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,731 (7th Cir. 2001).
APPEALS. The IRS has announced a pilot program aimed
at cutting the time it takes to resolve disputes between the
tax agency and corporate taxpayers. The Large and Mid-Size
Business Division Fast Track Dispute Resolution Pilot
Program creates a new opportunity for corporate taxpayers
to resolve outstanding issues early in the course of
disagreements during the examination process. Under fast
track, the taxpayer and LMSB officials have the option to
choose between two alternatives. The parties can decide that
the particular dispute should be resolved through mediation,
where an appeals official will seek to facilitate
communication and resolve factual issues. Alternatively, the
taxpayer and LMSB officials can opt for dispute resolution
that involves the appeals official rendering a settlement
recommendation. In the pilot phase, the program is available
to large and mid-sized businesses that currently have at least
one open year under examination and at least one disputed
issue. Rev. Proc. 2001-55, I.R.B. 2001-__.
BAD DEBTS. The taxpayer was an employee and
shareholder of a corporation. When the corporation began to
have financial difficulties, the taxpayer contributed money to
the corporation 29 times. The taxpayer claimed the money as
a business bad debt deduction when the corporation
terminated. The court examined 16 factors involving the
contribution of the money to determine that a bona fide debt
did not exist; therefore, the taxpayer could not claim a bad
debt deduction for the loss of the money. Of the 16 factors,
the court held that the following factors supported the
determination that no bona fide debt existed (1) only 11 of
the contributions were evidenced by promissory notes or
corporate resolutions; (2) the notes did not have fixed
maturity dates; (3) repayment of the contribution was
expected from corporate profits; (4) only the promissory
notes provided the taxpayer with enforcement authority; (5)
the repayment of the contributions was subordinated to other
corporate debt; (6) no security was required for the
contributions; (7) the corporation was thinly capitalized; (8)
the corporation could not obtain third party financing; (9) the
contributions were not repaid; (10) there was a high risk that
the contributions would not be repaid; (11) even though the
notes provided for interest, no interest was paid; and (12) the
corporation had no unattached funds to make the
repayments. Warning v. United States, 2001-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,729 (N.D. Okla. 2001).
CONSTRUCTIVE RECEIPT . The taxpayer was a
corporation wholly-owned by one shareholder. The
shareholder and the shareholder’s children were employees
of the corporation. The corporation was an accrual method
taxpayer with a fiscal year ending on July 31 but the
shareholder and children were all cash method taxpayers. No
employment contract existed and the employees did not take
any compensation in previous years. However, in 1994 the
taxpayer claimed a deduction for $100,000 in compensation
owed to the employees. The taxpayer took no formal action
prior to the end of its 1994 fiscal year to segregate physically
or set apart the $100,000 in compensation for The
employees. The taxpayer also did not make any entry in its
books of account to reflect the award of $100,000 in
co pensation prior to the end of the fiscal year. The
taxpayer made no specific allocation of the $100,000 in
compensation between the shareholder and the children until
after he end of the fiscal year. The court held that the
 was not entitled to claim a 1994 fiscal year
deduction for the $100,000 in compensation because the
taxpayer failed to executed the proper corporate formalities
which would have made the compensation award
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enforceable by the employees prior to the end of the
taxpayer’s fiscal year. Tesco Driveaway Co., Inc. v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-294.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS-ALM §
4.02[14].* The taxpayer had filed suit for employment
discrimination against a former employer. The parties
reached a negotiated settlement. The taxpayer sought a
refund of income taxes withheld by the employer from the
settlement. The taxpayer argued that the provision which
excludes from gross income amounts received for physical
injuries but includes in income amounts received for
nonphysical injuries was a violation of the equal protection
clause of the Fifth Amendment. The court held that the
provision was constitutional because it had a rational basis in
attempting to establish a uniform policy for taxation of
lawsuit damage awards and settlements. Young v. United
States, 2001-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,732 (W.D. Ky.
2001).
DEDUCTIONS. The taxpayer had sufficiently high
income that, under I.R.C. § 68, a portion of the taxpayer’s
state and local income taxes was not deductible. The
taxpayer was also self-employed and was allowed a
deduction for only a portion of the taxpayer’s health
insurance costs. The taxpayer purchased an apartment and
paid cash for the entire cost, leaving no mortgage interest to
deduct. The taxpayer argued that these limitations were
unconstitutional but the court held that the limitations on
deductions were reasonably related to the Congressional
purposes involved. Campbell v. United States, 2001-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,716 (S.D. N.Y. 2001).
DEPRECIATION . The IRS has issued guidance
providing taxpayers further relief from the application of the
mid-quarter convention contained in the depreciation rules.
The notice provides that taxpayers may elect not to apply the
mid-quarter convention if their third or fourth quarter
includes September 11, 2001. A future issue of the Digest
will publish an article by  Neil Harl on Notice 2001-70 and
Notice 2001-74.  Notice 2001-74, I.R.B. 2001-__.
The taxpayer was in the food manufacturing and
distribution business and used reusable containers for
shipping its products. The ruling does not identify the
product or the type of container. The taxpayer’s business
activity matches Asset Class 20.5, Manufacture of Other
Food and Kindred Products, from Rev. Proc. 87-56, 1987-2
C.B. 674. Assets in class 20.4 have a recovery period of
seven years for purposes of I.R.C. § 168(a) and 12 years for
purposes of I.R.C. § 168(g). The taxpayer argued that the
reusable containers were in asset class 20.5, Manufacture of
Food and Beverages--Special Handling Devices. The IRS
ruled that the containers were Asset class 20.4 because the
containers were usable for other products and the containers
would not have to be modified because of a change in
product. Ltr. Rul. 200144031, July 17, 2001.
DISASTER PAYMENTS . On October 25, 2001, the
President determined that certain areas in Oklahoma were
eligible for assistance under the Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5121, as a result of
tornadoes, severe storms, and flooding on October 9-10,
2001. FEMA-1395-DR. Accordingly, a taxpayer who
sustained a loss attributable to the disasters may deduct the
loss on his or her 2000 federal income tax return.
IRA . The taxpayer was employed for several years with an
employer which provided a 401(k) pension account for the
taxpayer. The account contained both employer and
employee contributions. When the taxpayer terminated
employment the amount in the pension plan was rolled over
to an IRA. The taxpayer made withdrawals from the IRS but
did not include the withdrawals in income. The taxpayer
argued that the money rolled over to the IRS was post-tax
contributions such that withdrawal was not subject to tax.
The court held that the evidence indicated that all the funds
in the pension account were pre-tax contributions from the
employer and taxpayer; therefore, the taxpayer had no
income tax basis in the IRA funds and they were included in
the gross income when withdrawn. Hendricks v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 2001-299.
MILEAGE DEDUCTION . The standard mileage rate for
2002 is 36.5 cents per mile for business use, 14 cents per
mil  for charitable use and 13 cents per mile for medical and
moving expense purposes. Rev. Proc. 2001-54, I.R.B. 2000-
48.
PASSIVE ACTIVITY LOSSES . The taxpayers were two
brothers who each owned 50 percent of a C corporation
which operated a construction and real estate sales business.
When the corporation had financial difficulties, the brothers
individually purchased construction equipment and leased
th  equipment to the corporation. The brothers claimed
l sses from the rental activity as business deductions but the
IRS disallowed the deductions as passive activity losses. The
taxpa ers argued that the rental activity was excepted from
the passive activity loss limitations by Temp. Treas. Reg. §
1.469-1T(e)(3) because the rental activity was incidental to
the taxpayers’ nonrental activities. The IRS argued that the
regulation required the taxpayers to stop using the equipment
in their nonrental activity before using the equipment in the
rental activity. The court held that the regulation did not
contain any  such requirement. The court also held that the
taxpayers met the material participation requirements for the
rental activity because the taxpayers elected to treat the
rental and corporate activity as one activity for purposes of
the passive activity loss limitation rules. Blewett v.
Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2001-174.
The taxpayer was an attorney who owned several pieces of
rental real estate. The taxpayer claimed business deductions
for losses from the rental activity and the IRS disallowed the
losses as passive activity losses. The taxpayer provided
summaries of the number of hours spent on the rental
activity but the court dismissed the evidence as unreliable
because it was not supported by contemporaneous written
records. The court held that the taxpayer did not materially
participate in the activity because the taxpayer failed to
demonstrate that the taxpayer spent more than 500 hours on
the activity or that the taxpayer spent more time on the rental
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activity that on the taxpayer’s law practice. B iley v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-296.
The taxpayers were trusts established under a decedent’s
will. The trusts held commercial property which produced
passive rental activity income and loss. The trusts borrowed
money to purchase other interests in the properties and
sought a ruling as to whether the interest on the borrowed
money would be considered passive activity expense subject
to the passive activity loss limitation rules. The IRS ruled
that the interest expense resulting from a loan used to
purchase property used in a passive activity would be subject
to the passive activity loss limitation. Ltr. Rul. 200144013,
Aug. 1, 2001.
The taxpayers owned the majority of the stock of an S
corporation which provided management services for several
partnerships in which the taxpayers owned an interest. The
taxpayers actively participated in the management activities
of the corporation but received passive income and losses
from the partnerships. The taxpayers offset the passive
income and nonpassive losses, arguing that was allowed by
the legislative history of I.R.C. § 469 because the S
corporation and partnerships were related entities with
income and deductions arising from the same activities. The
IRS argued that the offset was not allowed because the
statute and regulations under the statute allowed such offset
only for interest items by lenders. The Tax Court held that
the failure of the IRS to promulgate regulations in keeping
with the legislative history did not prevent the offset which
was otherwise allowable under the letter and intent of the
statute. The appellate court reversed, holding that the statute
was plain and unambiguous in prohibiting the offset of
passive income against nonpassive losses. Hillman v.
Comm’r, 263 F.3d 338 (4th Cir. 2001), aff’g on rehearing,
250 F.3d 228 (4th Cir. 2001), rev’g, 114 T.C. 103 (2000).
PENSION PLANS. The IRS has issued proposed
regulations relating to incentive stock options (ISOs)
described in I.R.C. § 422(b) and options granted under an
employee stock purchase plan (ESPP options) described in
I.R.C. § 423(b). The proposals, which would affect
employers granting such options and employees exercising
the options, provide guidance concerning the application of
FICA, FUTA and Collection of Income Tax at Source to the
options. The IRS also released two related notices that set
forth proposed rules regarding (1) an employer's income tax
withholding and reporting obligations upon the sale or
disposition of stock acquired pursuant to the exercise of a
statutory stock option and (2) application of FICA and
FUTA to statutory stock options. Notice 2001-72, Notice
2001-73, I.R.B. 2001-__; NPRM REG-142686-01.
The IRS has issued a revenue procedure which extends the
GUST 1 remedial amendment period under I.R.C. § 401(b)
for qualified retirement plans. First, the revenue procedure
extends the GUST remedial amendment period for all plans
to February 28, 2002, if the period would otherwise end
before then. Second, the revenue procedure provides an
additional extension to June 30, 2002, for plans that were
directly affected by the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
Finally, the revenue procedure provides that in cases of
substantial hardship resulting from the terrorist attacks the
IRS may, in its discretion, grant additional extensions of the
GUST remedial amendment period to particular plans up to
December 31, 2002. Rev. Proc. 2001-55, I.R.B. 2001-__.
PENALTIES . The IRS has issued a revenue procedure
which identifies circumstances under which the disclosure
on a taxpayer's return of a position with respect to an item is
adequate for the purpose of reducing the understatement of
income tax under I.R.C. § 6662(d) (relating to the substantial
understatement aspect of the accuracy-related penalty), and
for the purpose of avoiding the preparer penalty under I.R.C.
§ 6694(a) (relating to understatements due to unrealistic
positions). Rev. Proc. 2001-52, I.R.B. 2001-__.
RETURNS. The IRS has issued guidance supplementing
th  ax r lief that it granted earlier to taxpayers affected by
he terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The new
measur  supplement those provided in Notice 2001-61,
I.R.B. 2001-40, 305, to extend additional tax deadlines for
certain affected taxpayers. Those who have an extended
filing deadline falling between December 1, 2001, through
January 31, 2002, will have until February 15, 2002, to file
any tax returns due. The extension applies to “affected
taxpayers” that have difficulty meeting their federal tax
obligations because their records, computers, or other
essenti l supporting services were lost or damaged, or
ess ntial personnel were injured or killed, in the attacks. The
IRS has also released a list of time-sensitive acts that may be
postponed in a disaster. If an affected taxpayer has a
deadline for performing any of the listed acts, the deadline is
postponed by 120 days if it would otherwise expire between
September 11, 2001, and November 30, 2001. This guidance
applies to individuals serving in the armed forces in a
combat zone, or in support of such armed forces, and to
affected taxpayers within the meaning of Treas. Reg. §
301.7508A-1(d)(1). IR-2001-105, Nov. 2, 2001.
In Notice 2000-61, I.R.B. 2001-40, the IRS provided
extensions and postponements for taxpayers affected by the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. In Notice 2001-68, the
IRS announced that the extensions and postponements of
Notice 2001-61 did not apply to owners of passthrough
entities where only the entity was affected. The IRS has now
announced that it has expanded the relief to partners,
shareholders, or beneficiaries of passthrough entities that had
income tax returns due (either originally or on extension) on
or after September 11, 2001, and on or before November 2,
2001 (the date the IRS released Notice 2001-68), but did not
file the return because the taxpayer believed that the IRS had
granted a 120 day postponement solely by virtue of the
taxpayer's interest in an affected entity. An . 2001-117,
I.R.B. 2001-__.
SALE OR LEASE. The taxpayer was approached by
another person for financing of a restaurant. The other
person owned a liquor license. The taxpayer agreed to
construct the restaurant and lease it to the person. The
taxpayer formed a corporation to purchase the land and
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construct the restaurant. The lessee transferred the liquor
license to the corporation for minimal consideration. The
lease terms included rent over 15 years which corresponded
to amortization of the construction costs at a 15 percent
interest rate. The lease provided the lessee with the option to
purchase the property after 10 years at 125 percent of the
remaining lease payments. The lessee was responsible for all
expenses and taxes from the property. During construction
of the restaurant, the lease payments were adjusted to reflect
additional construction costs. The corporation treated the
transaction as a lease on its income tax returns but the lessee
treated the payments as loan payments. The court held that
the transaction was a sale and financing arrangement
requiring the taxpayer to recognize gain from the transaction
because (1) the conveyance of the liquor license for minimal
consideration indicated that the license was transferred as
collateral for the transaction, (2) the lessee had all the risks
and benefits of ownership of the property and the taxpayer
had a fixed return; (3) the payments included an interest
component and were dependent upon the total cost of the
construction; (4) the option to purchase gave the lessee all
the benefits of any appreciation of the property; and (5) the
lessee had been seeking a financing source for the restaurant.
The appellate court affirmed in a decision designated as not
for publication. Guaderrama v. Comm’r, 2001-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,714 (10th Cir. 2001), aff’g T.C. Memo.
2000-104.
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
PECAN HARVESTER. The plaintiff was injured while
operating a pecan harvester manufactured by the defendant.
The harvester had become clogged and the plaintiff
inspected the harvester while it was running. During the
inspection, the plaintiff’s jacket was caught by the drive
shaft, resulting in injury to the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought
suit under the Louisiana Products Liability Act, La. Rev.
Stat. § 9:2800.51 et seq., alleging that the harvester was
unreasonably dangerous. The evidence demonstrated that a
bolt on the drive shaft had been broken and was replaced
with a larger bolt. The defendant’s main argument was that
the plaintiff’s actions with the harvester, including the
clothing worn at the time, were not within the scope of
reasonably anticipated uses of the harvester. The court held
that there was sufficient evidence that the plaintiff’s method
of inspection and clothing were well within the reasonably
anticipated actions for users of pecan harvesters. Ellis v.
Weasler Engineering, Inc., 258 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2001).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
FIXTURES. The debtor had purchased 80 acres of
farmland on which a center-pivot irrigation system was
installed. The debtor granted a mortgage to the lender which
covered the land and all fixtures.  Several years later, the
debtor granted a security interest to another creditor in all
farm equipment. The debtor sought to sell the land as part of
a Chapter 12 bankruptcy case and the two creditors each
sought to include the irrigation system under their security
interests. The Bankruptcy Court looked to P oples State
Bank v. Clayton, 580 P.2d 1375 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978), which
established a three step judicial test for determining whether
personal property was a fixture under Kansas law. The court
held that the irrigation system was a fixture covered by the
mortgage because (1) the system was firmly attached to the
realty above and below ground; (2) the system was not easily
remov d because it would be time consuming and expensive
to disma tle and remove all the equipment; and (3) the
system was necessary for the full use of the land.  The court
also noted a fourth test provided by the UCC that the goods
would reasonably be expected to be sold with the land. The
court held that farmland in the area required irrigation for
full usefulness; therefore, buyer would reasonably expect to
have an xisting irrigation system included in the sale of the
land. The court noted two cases which also held center-pivot
systems to be fixtures: Rayl v. Shull Enterprises, Inc., 700
P.2d 567 (1984) Idaho 1984); Western Ag. Land Partners v.
Washington Dept. of Revenue, 716 P.2d 310 (Wash. Ct. App.
1986). In re Sand & Sage Farm and Ranch, Inc., 266 B.R.
507 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2001).
WILLS
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY. In June 1995, the
decedent transferred the decedent’s farm to a land
preservation charity, reserving a life estate in the decedent.
In July and August 1995, the decedent  executed
ame dments to the will which provided for passage of the
decedent’s residuary estate to the land preservation charity.
In the fall of 1995, the decedent was diagnosed  to have
Alzheimer’s disease. After the death of the decedent, the
decedent’s will was contested by the decedent’s sister and
nephew on the basis of the decedent’s lack of testamentary
capacity when the will was executed. Although the sister and
nephew presented expert testimony about the decedent’s
Alzheimer’s disease, the court held that testimony was
u reliable because it was based primarily on observations of
the decedent several months after the will execution. The
rt also held that the testimony of the decedent’s advisors
about the decedent’s condition at the time of the will’s
execution supported a ruling that the decedent was
competent at that time. Landmark Trust, Inc. v. Goodhue,
No. 1999-381 (Vt. 2001).
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ZONING
AGRICULTURAL USE. The defendant county decided to
construct a fire station on land zoned for exclusive farm use
(EFU). The fire station was intended to serve primarily rural
residents and businesses but was available for some urban calls.
Approximately 5 percent of the station’s service area was
within urban boundaries. The Oregon Land Use Board of
Appeals (LUBA) ruled that the construction and operation of
the fire station did not violate the EFU zoning because the
station was to be used primarily for rural residents. The
plaintiff argued that Or. Rev. Stat. § 215.283 (“Fire service
facilities providing rural fire protection.”) allowed fire stations
on EFU land only if the station exclusively served rural
residents. The court held that the statute did not expressly set
any limitation on the area served by a fire station on EFU land
but the court reasoned that the fair station must at least serve a
predominately rural area; therefore, the LUBA decision was
correct. Keicher v. Clackamas County, 29 P.3d 1155 (Or. Ct.
App. 2001).
CITATION UPDATES
In re C.F. Foods, L.P., 265 B.R. 71 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001)
(preferential transfers) see p. 139 supra.
Estate of Shackleford v. United States, 262 F.3d 1028 (9th
Cir. 2001), aff’g, 99-2 U.S.  Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,356 (E.D.
C l. 1999) (estate property valuation) see p. 148 supra.
Gladden v. Comm’r, 262 F.3d 851 (9th Cir. 2001), rev’g
and rem’g, 112 T.C. 209 (1999) (capital assets) see p. 141
supra.
IN THE NEWS
LABOR . A federal District Court judge has ordered Iowa
Beef Packing, Inc. to pay $3 million to 815 current and former
employees for uncompensated time spent to put on and remove
work clothing.
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